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Protecting	the	UK	public	against	COVID-19:	what
policy	lessons	can	be	learned	from	the	experience	of
the	Blitz?
The	COVID-19	pandemic	and	the	Second	World	War	aerial	bombing	campaign	against	the	UK
both	exposed	the	civilian	population	to	a	sustained	threat.	Risk,	whether	from	exposure	to	viral
load	or	the	density	of	the	bombing,	led	to	a	range	of	protective	measures	and	behavioural
regulations	being	implemented.	Edgar	Jones	outlines	key	policy	lessons	from	the	1939-45
experience	that	may	prove	useful	today.
During	the	lockdown	imposed	as	a	result	of	COVID-19,	politicians	evoked	the	‘Blitz	spirit’	to
encourage	resilience	and	collective	responsibility.	Whilst	historians	observed	that	the	term	failed	to	capture	the
complex	reality	of	how	people	responded	to	air-raids,	the	parallel	between	the	pandemic	and	the	bombing	of
civilians	has	value	in	terms	of	behavioural	science.	In	both	cases,	governments	sought	to	maintain	production	and
essential	services	without	being	able	to	protect	people	from	harm.	Mortality	rates	are	similar	and	associated	with
those	living	in	more	densely	populated	areas.	In	these	respects,	COVID-19	is	not	the	unprecedented	event	that
commentators	repeatedly	claim.
In	a	recent	article	based	on	archival	research	of	ministerial	records	and	state-directed	research,	I	argue	that	there
are	lessons	for	current	practice	and	policy.	First,	government	and	its	advisors	ignored	crucial	evidence	in	the
preparation	period	for	both	events.	In	the	1930s,	reports	of	Japanese	bombing	of	Chinese	towns	and	Nationalist
bombing	of	Republicans	in	Spain	revealed	evidence	of	adaptability	and	the	absence	of	panic.	Yet	these	findings
were	rejected,	and	policies	introduced	based	on	innate	fearfulness	and	a	desire	for	protection,	a	so-called	‘deep
shelter	mentality’.	Equally,	little	attempt	was	made	to	gather	evidence	from	Wuhan	or	from	Italy	early	in	2020
because	of	supposed	cultural	and	demographic	differences.	Further,	the	Scientific	Pandemic	Influenza	Group	on
Behaviour	(SPI-B)	cautioned	against	the	use	of	evidence	gathered	from	other	nations	based	on	findings	from	the
H1N1	pandemic	of	2009.	However,	these	related	to	different	rates	of	hand-washing,	wearing	of	masks	or	aspects	of
social	distancing,	though	the	percentage	differences	were	arguably	nuances.
A	study	of	shelter	behaviour	in	World	War	Two	would	have	revealed	the	importance	of	home.	During	air-raids,
people	preferred	to	remain	in	their	own	houses,	rather	than	go	to	deep	shelters,	even	though	this	sacrificed	safety.
Lockdown	was	delayed,	in	part,	because	the	government	believed	it	would	be	difficult	to	enforce	and	later	may	have
underestimated	the	difficulty	of	encouraging	people	back	to	work.	People	often	led,	rather	than	followed,
government	policy.	Many	offices	and	schools	closed	their	premises	before	the	lockdown	was	imposed	and	the
vulnerable	began	shielding	before	officially	advised	to	do	so.
Although	UK	politicians	repeatedly	state	that	policy	is	driven	by	science,	the	process	by	which	evidence	is	applied
to	behavioural	regulations	and	the	organisation	of	services	remains	unclear.	Significant	differences	exist	between
the	way	scientists	were	involved	in	World	War	Two	and	today.	The	cabinet	that	evolved	by	the	mid-point	of	the	war
drew	on	diverse	talent,	whilst	the	recruitment	of	gifted	individuals	from	industry,	the	City,	universities	and	the
professions	to	the	Civil	Service	created	an	administration	with	broad	expertise.	Scientists	were	integrated	at	all
levels	of	government.	Frederick	Lindemann,	a	physicist	and	director	of	the	Clarendon	Laboratory	at	Oxford,	joined
the	cabinet	in	1942,	albeit	as	Paymaster	General.	John	Anderson,	who	had	studied	the	chemistry	of	uranium	and
served	as	Home	Secretary	and	Minister	of	Home	Security,	was	largely	responsible	for	setting	up	the	Civil	Defence
Research	Committee	in	May	1939	to	address	the	prevailing	ignorance	about	the	physical	and	psychological
consequences	of	explosions.	J.D.	Bernal,	a	physicist,	and	Solly	Zuckerman,	a	physiologist,	were	recruited	to
undertake	a	series	of	government-funded	investigations	in	London,	Hull	and	Birmingham.	Henry	Tizard,	the	chemist
and	Rector	of	Imperial	College,	led	a	technical	and	scientific	mission	to	the	United	States	in	1940	and	served	as
adviser	to	the	Air	Staff	and	chairman	of	the	Scientific	Advisory	Committee.	The	wartime	model,	designed	to	provide
informed	solutions,	was	one	of	integration,	in	which	scientists	also	served	as	policy	makers.	In	the	post-war	period,
functional	links	were	progressively	eroded	with	scientists	being	given	circumscribed	roles.	Tizard	became	chief
scientist	to	the	Ministry	of	Defence	and	Zuckerman	was	appointed	in	1964	as	the	government’s	first	chief	scientific
adviser,	a	post	with	no	formal	management	responsibility.
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Today,	scientists	are	not	integrated	within	government	but	organised	into	increasing	large	and	numerous
committees.	A	key	element	in	the	UK’s	response	to	serious	or	catastrophic	emergencies	is	the	activation	of	a
Scientific	Advisory	Group	for	Emergencies	(SAGE).	The	group	assembled	to	address	the	coronavirus	pandemic
has	grown	progressively	and	by	July	2020	comprised	86	members,	whilst	its	subsidiaries	SPB-1	has	40	members
and	the	Scientific	Pandemic	Influenza	Group	on	Modelling	(SPI-M)	has	44.	Hence,	over	a	hundred	scientists
produce	consensus	statements,	which	the	government’s	chief	scientific	adviser,	Patrick	Vallance,	presents	to	the
Cabinet	Office	Briefing	Room.	Having	so	many	researchers	with	routes	to	policymakers	offers	politicians	an
opportunity	to	be	selective	in	the	advice	that	they	follow.	Evidence	given	to	House	of	Commons	Select	Committee
on	Health	and	Social	Care	in	July	2020	revealed	a	concern	about	governance.	Paul	Nurse	observed	that	it	was
often	unclear	which	individuals	or	departments	had	responsibility	for	decisions	so	that	scientists	did	not	know	to
whom	they	should	direct	evidence.	By	the	nature	of	its	size,	SAGE	appears	to	be	a	forum	primarily	designed	for
discussion,	whilst	the	practical	implementation	of	advice	remains	with	politicians,	allowing	them	to	ignore	findings	or
adopt	policies	for	which	there	is	no	evidence.
Pandemics	are	like	wars;	they	threaten	lives	often	in	random	or	unpredictable	ways.	COVID-19	has	arguably
produced	the	most	invasive	change	to	peoples’	daily	existence	since	1945.	Governments	are	always	likely	to	make
mistakes	at	the	outset	of	such	crises	as	they	struggle	to	understand	the	new	realities.	Scientists	too	face	challenges
attempting	to	draw	conclusions	from	imperfect	or	uncertain	knowledge.	Whilst	it	is	imperative	that	they	work
together	in	a	constructive	partnership,	the	most	effective	mechanisms	are	far	from	clear.	The	delay	in	introducing	a
lockdown	to	the	UK	despite	clear	evidence	of	its	value	in	Singapore,	Vietnam,	South	Korea	and	Germany	suggests
that	the	current	system	has	limitations.	Much	may	plausibly	be	learnt	from	the	systems	devised	by	the	UK
government	by	the	end	of	World	War	Two	and	from	those	nations	that	succeeded	in	keeping	mortality	rates	from
coronavirus	at	low	levels.
___________________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	The	Lancet	Psychiatry.
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